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Chapter 5
Ethics, Insurance Pricing, Genetics,
and Big Data
Robert Klitzman

Dramatic technological advances in computers and genomics are radically
transforming countless aspects of contemporary life, including health care,
life expectancy, retirement and ﬁnancial planning, posing opportunities,
but also profound ethical and public policy challenges. In the future,
genetic testing promises to affect many aspects of health care and estimates
of life expectancy in ways that can signiﬁcantly shape decisions about various
aspects of ﬁnancial planning. Data that include genetic information are, for
instance, yielding new insights on how best to diagnose, prevent, and treat
many diseases, from cancer to Alzheimer’s, and revealing factors associated
with aging and longer or shorter lifespans. Such data can thus potentially
inﬂuence perceived needs for, and pricing of, life, disability, and long-term
care insurance (Callaway 2019), and various other ﬁnancial products and
services. Individuals who have genes that increase risks for Alzheimer’s, for
example, may decide to retire earlier and/or try to purchase more insurance than they would otherwise, and have different investment goals or
needs. Based on genetic information, individuals may also decide not to
have children, or to try to screen embryos for certain diseases, which may or
may not succeed.
As scholars and others probe how technologies may disrupt and alter
ﬁnancial services and pension planning, it is vital to consider how computer,
genetic, and other technologies are combining and transforming each
other to refashion these domains.

The Case of Life Insurers
The effects on life insurance raise many of these issues in stark relief, and are
thus explored below, as a case-in-point. Critical questions emerge, for
instance, regarding whether companies selling life, disability, and longterm care insurance should have access to consumers’ genetic information,
and whether certain individuals, due to their genetics, will consequently be
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denied coverage or face unaffordable prices. In deciding whether to sell
such insurance policies and at what price, insurers routinely consider applicants’ risk factors such as smoking and obesity, but society is now beginning
to ask whether genetic information should be treated differently.

Background Concerning Genetics
Genes consist of deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) that in turn is composed
largely of four nucleotides: guanine, cytosine, thymine, and adenine (abbreviated GCTA). Sequences of thousands of these nucleotides (commonly
described using these abbreviations of four ‘letters’) code particular proteins that have various functions in the human body. Periodically, one such
letter mistakenly replaces another—a misspelling. Some such misspellings
are benign, while others may selectively harm or help the organism, significantly increasing or decreasing morbidity and mortality.
Technological advances have yielded inexpensive genetic testing, including whole genome sequencing. Over the past two decades, the cost of
sequencing one individual’s genome has fallen dramatically from several
hundred million to less than one thousand dollars (though that current cost
does not include interpretation of the information). Yet questions of privacy, conﬁdentiality, and potential stigma and discrimination emerge.
Direct-to-consumer genetic testing companies such as 23andme have sold
their ﬁles on one million customers’ genomic information to pharmaceutical companies for $60 million (Herper 2015). This raises additional ethical
questions regarding ownership of such data. The rapid spread and expansion of big data have thus made genetic information more cheaply and easily
shared, sold, and resold, either with or without individuals’ knowledge,
understanding, willingness, or explicit permission. Questions surface
regarding how readily these data can identify individuals, whether the uses
of these shared data sets should be limited in any ways, and if so, who and
how they should decide.
With just a few other bits of data about an individual (e.g., date of birth
and zip code), genomic data can be identifying, raising possibilities of
discrimination (Erlich and Narayanan 2014). Science ﬁction scenarios as
in the ﬁlm Gattaca highlight public fears of potential misuses of genetic data.
In the US, the Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act (GINA; US
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission 2008) currently bars use of
genetic information for health insurance underwriting decisions, but not for
life, long-term care, or disability insurance.
The plummeting cost and widening use of genetic testing make these
issues ever more pressing. Individuals at risk of serious diseases that are
associated with genetic tests may fear loss of insurance coverage or higher
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costs, and thus avoid genetic tests that might aid the prevention, diagnosis,
or treatment of the disease. In the future, for instance, hospitals may
sequence the genes of all patients who enter the institution, using left over
blood samples, and store the information in large databanks. Questions
therefore emerge of who should have access to such information—whether
any researcher, pharmaceutical company, law enforcement ofﬁcial, school,
insurer should potentially see the data and if so, to what speciﬁc
information—for example, if certain identiﬁers should ﬁrst be removed,
and if so, which. US policymakers recently wrestled with a few of these
dilemmas in revising the so-called Common Rule (Ofﬁce for Human
Resource Protections 2009, 2016), regulating human subjects research,
including use of large biobanks. The revised Common Rule (2016) allows
for broad onetime consent for unspeciﬁed future research uses, provided
certain privacy protections are met. What remains to be determined is how
exactly such regulations will be implemented, what unanticipated challenges may arise, what kinds of patient consent may be needed in other
situations, and whether any restrictions should be placed on data sharing.
Questions also persist regarding whether all patients will ﬁnd these situations acceptable or might avoid certain tests or medical care as a result.
Problems also arise of potential misinterpretation by both providers and
patients of genetics, statistics (e.g., absolute vs relative risks), and genetic
tests (concerning relatively large numbers of variants of uncertain signiﬁcance). Levels of understanding of genetics are low among providers,
including most physicians. Most internists rate their knowledge as very/
somewhat poor concerning genetics (73.7 per cent) and guidelines for
genetic testing (87.1 percent), and most felt they need more training on
when to order tests (79 percent), how to counsel patients (82 percent),
interpret results (77.3 percent), and maintain privacy (80.6 percent)
(Klitzman et al. 2013).
Concerns arise, too, given noted examples of hacking of data from major
corporations and institutions. Violations of conﬁdentiality have occurred
through various means, both intended and accidental (Rouse et al. 2019).

Challenges Concerning Life Insurance
Life insurance permits pooling of the ﬁnancial risks of unanticipated disability, chronic disease, or premature death, providing a key social value,
preventing survivors from becoming impoverished after a wage-earner dies.
Large numbers of policyholders come to share these risks.
But as more consumers obtain genetic testing, often on their own,
actuarial risk assessments will become more complicated (Klitzman et al.
2014). Consumers may discover that they possess genes that increase their
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risks of sudden cardiac or other premature death or Alzheimer’s disease or
other conditions that may require long-term care. These individuals may
not disclose these test results to insurers, but buy insurance. People with
highly penetrant genes for diseases that lack effective prevention or treatment report being advised to undergo anonymous testing, and if they learn
they have the mutation, to purchase life, disability, and long-term care
insurance (Klitzman 2012). Individuals who learn that they have genes
associated with increased risks of Alzheimer’s, for instance, are 2–3 times
more likely to purchase long-term care insurance or to plan to do so
(Taylor et al. 2010). Another study of individuals testing for genes associated with Alzheimer’s disease found no signiﬁcant differences in health,
life, or disability insurance purchases, but individuals who learned that they
had these genes were 5.76 times more likely to alter their long-term care
insurance (Zick et al. 2005). Knowledge asymmetry can result if consumers
have such information while insurers do not, causing ‘adverse selection’
and uneven playing ﬁelds.
Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976) have suggested that asymmetric information could signiﬁcantly affect insurance markets. Yet in analyzing data on
annuities in the UK, Finkelstein and Poterba (2004) found that asymmetric
information may affect certain aspects of consumer behavior, but not
others. Speciﬁcally, individuals who expected to live longer tend to purchase
more ‘back-loaded’ policies (that, over time, pay more per year), while
people who expect to live for shorter periods tend to purchase policies
that provide payouts to the consumer’s survivors. Nevertheless, asymmetric
selection did not appear to affect the size of the annuities purchased
(Finkelstein and Poterba 2004). These results suggest the need to look at
multiple aspects of life insurance policies that such asymmetric knowledge
can affect. As one strategy for diminishing potential adverse selection,
Brown and Warshawsky (2013) have suggested combining annuities and
long-term care insurance policies, pooling these products. Whether such an
approach will reduce adverse selection due to genetic testing is unclear.
If insurers decide to access genetic information, they could potentially do
so in several ways: through family history, medical records, asking applicants
if they or family members have had genetic tests performed, and asking
applicants to undergo such tests. The growth of electronic health records
(EHRs) heightens the accessibility of such data. Genetic test results are
increasingly becoming parts of EHRs, and insurance applications regularly
request releases of medical records.
Indeed, insurers are currently debating how to address these issues. In the
UK, life insurers have accepted a moratorium on using genetic information
(Association of British Insurers 2011). In the US, one American life insurance executive has stated that his company would ask for such genetic
information but did not wish to be the ﬁrst to do so (Peikoff 2014).
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A group of Canadian and European authors (Joly et al. 2014) has articulated
a set of broad questions requiring further examination along these lines.
In the US, however, life insurers remain uncertain what to do. Scientiﬁc
understandings of genomics are rapidly evolving. Though some have argued
that ‘genomic information about currently known common variants seldom
substantially affects mortality risk estimation that is already based on phenotype and family history’ (Klitzman et al. 2014: 2), genomic risk assessments
can be more accurate for highly penetrant disorders, than prognostications
based on family history. Even in a family whose parents both had breast
cancer and carry a BRCA gene, for example, a woman may be found to not
have the mutation, thereby lowering her risk signiﬁcantly. Many consumers’
genomic information may ultimately assist diagnosis, treatment and prevention, reducing risks. Knowledge of the presence of certain genes can motivate
individuals to reduce their risk behaviors and pursue enhanced medical
interventions. Insurers will need to appreciate how individuals without mutations for lethal disorders have lower risks than do the general population.
As seen in Table 5.1, nations differ considerably in how they confront
these issues. For instance, France and Germany have established full moratoria on insurers’ use of genetic test results, while Australia and Canada have
instituted partial moratoria (Knoppers et al. 2004).
TABLE . Moratoria on the use of genetic information
by life insurance companies
Yes

No

Partial

Canada
Finlanda
Francea
Germanya
Irelanda
New Zealand
South Africa
Swedena
Turkey
The United Kingdoma

Austria
Belgium
Bulgaria
Chile
Cyprus
Czech Republic
Denmark
Estonia
Georgia
Hungary
Iceland
India
Israel
Italy
Japan
Luxembourg
South Korea
Spain
Switzerland

Australia
Canada
Greece
New Zealand
South Africa

Note: a The amounts and expiration dates vary
Source: Knoppers et al. (2004).
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US federal legislation does not directly comment on life, disability, or
long-term care insurers using genetic information, and state laws range considerably. Vermont and a few other states prohibit use of genetic information,
while others bar use of genetic tests for certain conditions such as sickle-cell
trait (e.g., in North Carolina). New York requires speciﬁc informed consent
for genetic testing. Wisconsin requires that underwriting reﬂects actual risks
(National Human Genome Research Institute 2018). States thus range from
‘strong’ to ‘no protection.’
Insurers should avoid unfair discrimination, but the meaning of this
concept can differ, especially in the context of genetics (Klitzman et al.
2014). Deﬁnitions of ‘unfairness’ can involve weighing the competing interests of consumers vs. insurers. Insurance companies that know consumers’
genetic test results can stratify risks more accurately. At the same time,
insurers may make conservative business decisions, overestimating risks in
ways that lead to denials of coverage or signiﬁcantly increased costs for
certain consumers.
While scientiﬁc knowledge about the roles and predictiveness of many
genes is rapidly advancing, many uncertainties persist. Studies suggesting
that particular genes are highly associated with certain diseases have frequently failed to be replicated. Genetics research is often biased, selectively
focusing on severely ill patients, rather than the general population, thus
leading to overestimations of risks. Use of genetic information could thus
result in many individuals unjustiﬁably being priced out of the life insurance
market.

Possible Solutions
To address these concerns, several solutions are possible. First, government
policies could prohibit all insurers from using any genetic information. In
such a case, however, asymmetrical knowledge and adverse selection could
ensue. Presumably, insurance companies would then seek to amortize the
effect, increasing rates for all consumers. And some consumers may object,
wary of individuals with mutations who disproportionately buy insurance.
Research is thus needed to gauge how potential customers would view these
trade-offs.
Second, insurers could be allowed access to all genetic information
they seek. Unfortunately, some consumers might then be unable to obtain
insurance.
Third, insurers could be permitted to obtain genetic information only
about certain pre-deﬁned, well-characterized, highly-penetrant genes. Consumers with certain genes who reduce their risks through effective treatment or prevention would have prices lowered accordingly. A list of such
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highly predictive tests could be determined, and clearly listed. The number
of applicants excluded from coverage would thus presumably be reduced.
Extreme care and caution would be needed, however, since most genes are
not very penetrant, and environmental and other factors are involved in
whether, when and how symptoms may occur. How much insurance prices
would vary based on the presence or absence of these genes is also unclear.
Fourth, all individuals could be allowed to obtain a certain modest
amount of insurance, with insurers able to obtain genetic test results from
consumers who wish to buy additional coverage. This situation currently
exists in the UK, for instance, since individuals there must have life insurance to obtain a mortgage.
Since life insurance provides a social beneﬁt, public policy makers can
seek to maximize its availability. Accordingly, the option of providing a
certain modest amount of insurance to everyone may have certain advantages. Currently, in the US, social security offers some retirement annuity,
disability insurance, and survivors’ insurance to all who contribute. Medicaid and Supplemental Security Income also provide some long-term care
coverage and disability beneﬁts, but they favor lower-income individuals and
families. Moreover, the beneﬁts provided for living expenses (as opposed to
health care) are relatively limited for many individuals. Some employers also
offer varying degrees of life insurance coverage, though policies range
widely in generosity and cost.
If life insurers do access genetic information, input from genetic and
policy experts and public transparency will be crucial in establishing which
genes should be included. More population-based research is also vital to
determine accurately the unbiased prevalence and natural history of these
genetic markers and disorders. If insurers request information on results of
genetic tests, signiﬁcant caution is needed since patients may consequently
be wary of undergoing such testing, even when it may potentially aid their
heath. Insurance policies could disincentivize patients from pursuing
genetic testing that may be medically helpful, because of concerns about
consequent diminished future insurability. Genetic test results differ from
other medical data since individuals cannot alter their genes, as they can
their weight, diet, and amount of physical exercise. An individual’s genetic
test results can also unfairly impede family members’ insurability.
Key questions arise, too, regarding how companies allowed to access
genetic information would or should do so. Insurers might only inquire
whether individuals or family members have histories of certain speciﬁc
conditions, or ever undergone genetic testing, and if so, to self-report the
results. Alternatively, insurers might require potential customers to undergo
genetic testing and submit the data.
Major challenges would also arise because many individuals have variants
of uncertain signiﬁcance. Given the thousands of letters in each DNA
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sequence, scientists remain unsure whether certain gene variants in fact
impose major dangers, cause only slight impairments, are in fact benign, or
even are protective against a disease. Thus genetic test sequencing yields
high amounts of uncertainty, and deep questions arise regarding how
insurers will view and handle such ambiguities. Companies may want to
drastically raise costs for, or exclude many consumers, but such decisions
may be unwarranted since genetic risks may be minor, unlikely, and/or
potentially offset by other biological or environmental factors.
Economic models of the impact of using genetic testing tend to show that
outcomes depend on the assumptions imposed (Macdonald and Yu 2011;
Howard 2014). One model, for instance, assumed that 100 percent of
people with a particular high-risk gene will be tested over their lifetimes
(Howard 2014). Yet this ﬁgure seems unrealistically high, at least presently,
as well as in the near future. Indeed, rates of lifetime uptake of genetic
testing in the US remain very low: no more than 20 percent of individuals at
risk of HD have undergone testing, with only 14.7 percent of at-risk individuals doing so over 20 years in Northern Ireland (Morrison et al. 2011). For
diseases such as breast cancer, the rates are below about 20 percent
(Childers et al. 2017). Granted, such rates may increase if insurance company policies change, yet many people are wary of undergoing genetic tests,
due to fears of stigma and discrimination. Moreover, the US has very few
genetic counselors, making it unlikely that consumers could get the information needed when they are tested (Bureau of Labor Statistics 2018).

Conclusion
Federal and state policymakers, industry stakeholders, academic researchers,
and others need to examine these questions carefully. Public policy in this
area could inﬂuence whether patients opt to undergo genetic tests for medical reasons, ultimately helping or impeding individual and public health.
These issues also have critical implications for future research, underscoring needs to assess consumer attitudes regarding these tradeoffs. For
instance, it is not yet known how much consumers would pay to avoid
genetic testing. Additional research can elucidate views and attitudes in
ways that might inform government and industry decisions. An examination
of insurance company policies and decisions regarding genetics is also
important. It may also be important to establish an independent ombudsofﬁce to receive and review claims of unfair discrimination, when they arise.
Public trust in health care providers and institutions, government policymakers, and insurers is crucial, as the lives and welfare of countless individuals are at stake. Future research is also critical on how these technologies
will affect other consumer and industry choices as well. For example, it
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would be important to learn whether and to what degree certain consumers
will be more or less likely to seek certain kinds or amounts of ﬁnancial
products or services, and whether genetic data will affect decisions about
ﬁnancial portfolios and annuity pricing, and if so, how, and what challenges
will emerge as a result.
In short, to understand the impact of new technologies on individual and
company decisions regarding ﬁnancial products, several complexities
need to be considered. Computer technologies may alter not only the
types of products offered, but also consumers’ preferences based on information about themselves that technology provides. The term ‘FinTech’
should, arguably, thus be expanded from the way it is now sometimes
used, to address how a wide variety of new technologies have ﬁnancial
implications for both individuals and ﬁnancial institutions. Given how rapidly computer capabilities and analytics and genomic technologies are
advancing and evolving, these domains will continue to be critical to monitor and examine.
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